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Abstract
In this paper we adapt Burtless and Hausman’s (1978) methodology in order to
estimate farmers’ demand for irrigation water under increasing block-rate tariﬀs and
empirically assess its eﬀect on aggregate demand and inter-farm allocation eﬃciency.
This methodology overcomes the technical challenges raised by increasing block rate
pricing and accounts for both observed and unobserved technological heterogeneity
among farmers. Employing a micro panel data documenting irrigation levels and prices
in 185 Israeli agricultural communities in the period 1992-1997 we estimate water de-
mand elasticity at −0.3 in the short run (the eﬀect of a price change on demand within
a year of implementation) and −0.46 in the long run. We also ﬁnd that, in accordance
with common belief, switching from a single to a block price regime, yields a 7% reduc-
tion in average water use while maintaining the same average price. However, based
on our simulations we estimate that the switch to block prices will result in a loss of
approximately 1% of agricultural output due to inter-farm allocation ineﬃciencies.
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Recent decades of population and income growth have aggravated the problem of water
shortages in many parts of the world. This is increasingly leading policy makers to be inter-
ested in the use of economic incentives to rationalize water allocation. Advocated by many
economists (e.g. Yaron 1991, Michelsen, Taylor, Huﬀaker and McGuckin 1999, Zusman 1997)
as the economic inducement of choice, increasing block-rate tariﬀs are gaining popularity
among developed as well as developing countries (Boland and Whittington 2000). Al-
ready prevalent in the residential sector (e.g. Hewitt 2000), (e.g. Arbues, Garcia-Valinas
and Martinez-Espineira 2003), in recent years block-rate pricing has been gradually intro-
duced to regulate commercial and agricultural users. Speciﬁc examples include Californian
districts, European countries and Israel (e.g. Michelsen et al. 1999, Wichelns 1991, Huf-
faker, Whittlesey, Michelsen, Taylor and McGuckin 1998, Tsur and Dinar 1997, Kislev and
Vaksin 1997, Garrido 1999).
The main goal of block prices is to induce water use reduction without burdening
farmers with the full cost that simple marginal cost pricing would entail. In particular,
there is concern that marginal cost pricing in agriculture would crowd out family and small
farming. In contrast, an increasing price schedule allows imposing the high, socially optimal
price at the margin while maintaining a lower average price, thus keeping small farms in
business. Theoretical support for this assertion is provided by Bar-Shira and Finkelshtain
(2000) who showed that increasing block tariﬀs implements the second-best social objective
of maximizing welfare subject to a desired number of ﬁrms in the industry.
While conceptually attractive, the implementation of block prices raises several prac-
tical diﬃculties. In particular, to achieve the second-best allocation, each and every farmer
should pay, in equilibrium, the socially optimal price at the margin. However, in reality,
farmers’ heterogeneity virtually precludes a price schedule in which every farmer pays the
same price at the margin and yet pays a lower than the marginal price on average. Hence, in
practice, some farmers do not reach the high price tier at all and for others the average price
is too close to the marginal, resulting in ineﬃcient inter-farm water allocation and welfare
loss. The actual severity of these inter-farm ineﬃciencies can only be assessed empirically.
In spite of its growing use in agriculture, few empirical studies have investigated the
eﬀect of increasing block tariﬀs. In a pioneering study, Wichelns (1991) examines the eﬀect of
introducing increasing block-rate tariﬀs in the Broadview Water District in the central valley
of California. The responsiveness of irrigation depth to prices was examined by means of a
1linear OLS regression where variations in the ratio of applied water to crop water requirement
were explained by the marginal water price, soil type, area and crop dummies. In the case
of melon farms, Wichelns reports that the water price elasticity equals −0.82. However, in
the cases of three other crops, the hypothesis of no eﬀect of marginal price could not be
rejected. While Wichelns asserts that the no-eﬀect result is due to small price variations, an
alternative explanation is the endogeneity of the marginal price under the block-rate tariﬀ (for
details, see Moﬃtt 1990). Varela-Ortega, Sumpsi, Garrido, Blanco and Iglesias (1998) study
the consequences of a switching reform from a single-price to block-rate prices in European
agriculture. However, they utilized simulated, rather than actual data.
The reason for the small number of empirical studies on the eﬀect of block-pricing, is
partly lack of reliable data and partly the econometric complexities involved. In particular,
using the conventional OLS regressions to estimate demand under block prices would result
in biased estimations due to endogeneity and selection bias (e.g. Moﬃtt 1986, Moﬃtt 1990).
Modern analyses of piece-wise linear budget constraints, which block prices are a special case
of, use Moﬃtt’s exposition of Burtless and Hausman’s model. This framework was ﬁrst used
in the context of water pricing by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), who analyzed water demand
in the residential sector.
Here we adapt this methodology in order to estimate farmers’ demand for irrigation
water under increasing block-rate tariﬀs and empirically assess its eﬀect on aggregate de-
mand and inter-farm allocation eﬃciency. This methodology overcomes the technical chal-
lenges raised by increasing block-rate pricing and accounts for both observed and unobserved
technological heterogeneity among farmers. Employing a micro panel data documenting ir-
rigation levels and prices in 185 Israeli agricultural communities in the period 1992-1997 we
estimate water demand elasticity at −0.3 in the short-term (the eﬀect of a price change on
demand within a year of implementation) and −0.46 in the long-term. We also ﬁnd that,
in accordance with common belief, switching from a single to a block price regime yields
a 7% reduction in average water use while maintaining the same average price. However,
based on our simulations we estimate that the switch to block prices will result in a loss of
approximately 1% of agricultural output due to inter-farm allocation ineﬃciencies.
Our study is the ﬁrst to apply Burtless and Hausman’s methodology to an estimation of
agricultural water demand under tier pricing. Using similar methods, Hewitt and Hanemann
(1995) estimated a water demand elasticity of −1.72 for the residential sector, while Moeltner
and Stoddard (2004) found an elasticity in the range of −0.23 to −0.9 in various commercial,
non-agricultural sectors.
2The paper is organized as follows. The next section formalizes an economic model
of irrigation by heterogeneous farmers under block-rate prices. The econometric model is
introduced in the third section, followed by a detailed description of the data. Section 5
presents the estimation results, which are employed in Section 6 for a simulation of alternative
pricing policies and a welfare analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Irrigation-Water Demand Under Block Prices
Farmers maximize their proﬁts, π(w,x,z) = f(w,x,z)) −
R w
0 p(s)ds − qx, where w is the
amount of irrigated water, x is the vector of other inputs, p(·) and q are their prices, z is the
vector of farm and industry characteristics and the price of output is normalized to 1. The
technology is represented by the production function f(·) which is assumed to be increasing
and strictly concave in w and in x.





p1 if w ≤ w1
p2 if w1 < w ≤ w2
p3 if w2 < w
where p1 < p2 < p3 are price tiers and w1 < w2 are the water quantity thresholds (see Figure
1).
Straightforward maximization (the Khun Tucker conditions) implies that the farmer’s
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In most economic exercises the ﬁrst-order conditions hold with equality. This is not the case
with block prices where the water value marginal product (VMP) curve can pass between
the price tiers (curve D1 in Figure 1). In that case, p1 < fw(w∗,x∗,z) < p2 and the optimal
irrigation level is w1. Let D(p,q,z) be the inverse of the VMP, i.e. the water demand function
under a single-price regime. Then the water demand function under block prices is given by:
w(·) =

    
    
D(p1,q,z) if D(p1,q,z) < w1
w1 if D(p2,q,z) ≤ w1 ≤ D(p1,q,z)
D(p2,q,z) if w1 < D(p2,q,z) < w2
w2 if D(p3,q,z) ≤ w2 ≤ D(p2,q,z)










Figure 1: Increasing block price schedule
We turn now to the eﬀect of price change on the optimal irrigation level; an inﬁnitesimal
increase in all three block prices yields:
wp =

    
    
Dp(p1,q,z) if D(p1,q,z) ≤ w1
0 if D(p2,q,z) < w1 < D(p1,q,z)
Dp(p2,q,z) if w1 < D(p2,q,z) ≤ w2
0 if D(p3,q,z) < w2 < D(p2,q,z)
Dp(p3,q,z) if D(p3,q,z) > w2
(3)
where wp and Dp are derivatives with respect to p.1
It is interesting that while the VMP function is downward sloping everywhere, some
price change may not induce all farmers to reduce irrigation. This can be seen in Figure 2,
where we draw the water VMP curves of two farmers, D1 and D2, respectively. Initially, the
VMP of the ﬁrst intersects the price schedule at its vertical segment and the second intersects
at the high price tier. A price increase of both tiers does not aﬀect the quantity demanded
by farmer 1 and therefore reﬂects zero elasticity. Moreover, the eﬀect of the price increase on
the second farmer is mitigated by the fact that his VMP curves intersects the price schedule
at its vertical part after the change.
Hence, even if all farmers’ marginal product curves reﬂect the same elasticities, they
will react diﬀerently to a price change. The actual eﬀect of a price change on each farmer










Figure 2: The eﬀect of price change
is bounded above by the inverse elasticity of his marginal product curve. At one extreme, a
farmer whose marginal product curve crosses at a vertical part of the price schedule does not
react to small price changes. At the other extreme, a farmer whose marginal product curve
intersects the interior of the same price block before and after a price change will show a
demand elasticity as in the case of a single-price regime. Therefore, and we will elaborate on
this later, under block prices water aggregate demand is less sensitive to price changes than
under a single-price regime.
3 Econometric Methodology
We begin this section by introducing the statistical model, proceed with the estimation
methodology and conclude with the parametric speciﬁcation of demand.
3.1 The statistical model
Two sources of randomness are introduced into the economic model presented in Section 2.
Farmers’ heterogeneity, α ∼ (0,σα), and a measurement error, ε ∼ (0,σε). The ﬁrst is a ran-
dom eﬀect which captures variations across farms and over-time that are neither explained
by the observed characteristics nor by farm dummies. These may include variations in man-
5agement capabilities, local climatic conditions, etc. Although these factors are unobserved
by the econometrician, they are known to the farmer and hence taken into account in his
optimization process. The latter term, ε, represents a measurement error or mistakes in the
farmer’s optimization.
Following the literature on piece-wise linear budget constraints (e.g. Hausman 1985,
Moﬃtt 1986, Hewitt and Hanemann 1995), we adopt a linear additive formulation. Under
this assumption, we can rewrite (2) as:
w =

    
    
D(p1,q,z) + α + ε if α < w1 − D(p1,q,z)
w1 + ε if w1 − D(p1,q,z) ≤ α ≤ w1 − D(p2,q,z)
D(p2,q,z) + α + ε if w1 − D(p2,q,z) < α < w2 − D(p2,q,z)
w2 + ε if w2 − D(p2,q,z) ≤ α ≤ w2 − D(p3,q,z)
D(p3,q,z) + α + ε if α > w2 − D(p3,q,z).
(4)
This formulation reveals that while both α and ε aﬀect the observed demand, α alone
determines the optimal choice of the price block and the optimal irrigation level. It is
apparent that variations in the farmer’s type, α, in some ranges, would change neither his
optimal choice nor his observed one. By contrast, ε is unknown to the farmer and hence only
inﬂuences the observed irrigation level. In some cases, its realization could shift the farmer’s
observed demand from the optimal block to another. This important distinction between α
and ε is key in facilitating the econometric identiﬁcation of the two errors.
3.2 The estimation approach
Following Moﬃtt and others, we apply a maximum likelihood approach to estimate the model.
We proceed with the derivation of the observation likelihood. Denote by Pr(w|p(·),z,θ) the
probability of observing a certain level of irrigation, w, given the price schedule p(·), and
the observed characteristics z and θ. The latter includes demand parameters as well the
parameters of the distributions of the errors α and ε. The probability of observing w is the
sum of the joint probabilities of observing that irrigation value and that the planned decision
is on each block or vertical segment of the price schedule. That is,
Pr(w|p(·),z,θ) = Pr[α +  = w − D(p1,q,z),α ≤ w1 − D(p1,q,z)]
+ Pr[α +  = w − D(p2,q,z),w1 − D(p2,q,z) < α ≤ w2 − D(p2,q,z)]
+ Pr[α +  = w − D(p3,q,z),α > w2 − D(p3,q,z)] (5)
+ Pr[ = w − w1,w1 − D(p1,q,z) ≤ α ≤ w1 − D(p2,q,z)]
+ Pr[ = w − w2,w2 − D(p2,q,z) ≤ α ≤ w2 − D(p3,q,z)].





Assuming that the errors are statistically independent and normally distributed, α ∼ N(0,σα)
and ε ∼ N(0,σε), the likelihood in (6), in terms of the standard normal density, is readily
derivable. The details of the calculations are relegated to the appendix.
3.3 The empirical speciﬁcation
In the previous subsections, we outlined the economic model and sketched an adequate
econometric methodology to estimate it. We proceed by further parameterizing the model
to be estimated. The empirical speciﬁcation incorporates two additional features: ﬁrst we
allow Box-Cox transformation of the data, second we introduce lagged prices into the model.























The Box-Cox transformation is a relatively general formulation, nesting several func-
tional forms such as the logarithmic (λ = 0), the linear (λ = 1), the quadratic (λ = 2)
and the reciprocal (λ = −1) models as special cases. The parameter λ is to be estimated
simultaneously with the other parameters of the model so as to maximize the likelihood of
the data.
Lagged-price eﬀects are required here because we believe that the full
eﬀect of price changes may take time. That is, farmers may adjust their irrigation level
gradually in response to water-price changes. The reason for this is twofold. First, farmers
may not change their scale of operation as long as they are not sure whether the price change
is permanent or transitory. In this case, the irrigation response is limited by the horticultural
requirements. Second, and not unrelated to the ﬁrst reason, is the irreversible investment
embodied in agriculture. An increase in input price in the presence of irreversible investment
may leave the farmer covering his variable cost but not the total cost. In this case, the
farmer will let his capital depreciate and irrigation will continue as long as it is unnecessary
to reinvest. Consequently, water price changes have both short-term and a long-term eﬀects.
As variables explaining heterogeneity, zit, we use each farmer’s water quota, which
serves as an instrument for both the quantity and for his type of land, rainfall in his region,
2To ease the notation we treat z as a single variable in equations (7) and (8).
7other input prices, a time trend to capture technological changes - in particular water saving
ones - and a farmer dummy to capture a farm ﬁxed eﬀect.

















































which is the model that we estimate.
A few points are worth mentioning. First, while β1 measures the short-term eﬀect of
price change on water use, β1
1
1−γ measures its long-term eﬀect. Second, the coeﬃcient of
the last term in (8) is restricted to be equal to γδ. In the empirical application we test this
restriction in order to assess the validity of the lag structure in (7).
4 Institutional Description and Data
Israeli agriculture consists of two main subsectors. The “private sector” comprises several
hundred individual farmers, who together cultivate 20% of irrigated crops and produce 15%
of agricultural value added. The second sector is the “planned agricultural” sector, producing
the remaining 85% of the agricultural product. The planned sector consists of 415 cooperative
villages - Moshavim - and 315 collectives—Kibutzim. By the Israeli water law, each of the
individual farmers and each of the 730 planned cooperatives is legally a single consumer
receiving an annual water allocation and responsible for payment. Our micro level panel
describes irrigation and geographical data for all agricultural water consumers in Israel,
during the period 1992-1997. The data set was assembled in a joint project of the Israeli
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and the Agricultural Ministry Planning Authority and
is documented in an annual publication of the Agricultural Ministry: “Agricultural Sub
Industries” for various years. To ensure conﬁdentiality, the CBS reports the data of individual
farmers aggregated over large geographical areas. For that reason, we omit all individual
farmers from our analysis and focus on the “planned” sector.
Farmers in our panel use three types of water for irrigation: fresh water, which accounts
for 80% of the total irrigation, and semi-saline and reclaimed water comprising the rest. Since
various types of water diﬀer in their marginal product, we limit our analysis to farmers who
consume only fresh water. Under the 1959 Water Law, the supply of fresh water is regulated
8by the state. The main water supplier - Mekorot - a state-owned company, provides 60%
of the aggregate fresh-water supply to agriculture, whereas most of the rest is supplied by
regional utilities and water cooperatives that are owned by the farmers themselves. Whereas
Mekorot charges farmers according to the price schedule imposed by the state, the data from
other suppliers, who set their prices independently, are not available for research. Thus, we
are left with 185 cooperatives and semi-cooperatives, those who use only fresh water supplied
by Mekorot. They comprise 20% of the water use for irrigation in Israel.
4.1 Water quotas
The Israeli water law legislated in 1959 determines that water in both underground and
surface aquifers is state property. This implies that the pumping of water and its application
for irrigation require permits. Each year, the state water commissioner issues pumping
permits and each planned village is allocated a speciﬁc annual water quota for irrigation.
Initial, historical quotas were allotted according to village’s total land suitable for irrigated
agriculture, its land type and to other factors such as population size, location, water usage
in years prior to 1959, and political and organizational aﬃliations. During the 1960s and
1970s, quotas were enlarged to reﬂect the development of new water sources in Israel and the
establishment of new agricultural settlements in the Galilee and Negev regions. Occasionally,
water quotas were adjusted to reﬂect changes in the amount of land available for farming.
In recent years, however, increased urban demand and the allocation of water to Jordan as
dictated by the 1994 peace treaty, have led to a gradual reduction in the quotas of fresh
water for irrigation.
Important questions for our analysis are: to what extent were the quotas enforced and
were they binding? If they were, water application would reﬂect quotas rather than the
marginal product of water. With respect to the second question, we note that in the last
20 years, with the exception of years with severe droughts, the Israeli agricultural sector
consumed less fresh water than was allotted to it. In our sample, only 12% of the farmers
exceeded their quotas and even then, there is not a single case recorded where any sanction
was imposed. Thus, we are satisﬁed that the observed water application does reﬂect water
marginal productivity.
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of water quotas in our panel. It shows
considerable variations in the levels of the quotas across farmers and over the years. The
diﬀerences across users reﬂect the fact that at the time when the quotas were allocated,
some farmers were growing water-intensive crops, such as citrus, while others relied on crops
9Table 1: Quotas (thousands of cubic meters)
Year Mean Max Min Std. Dev.
1992 773 1550 213 264
1993 927 1650 239 297
1994 844 1539 229 273
1995 848 1650 239 269
1996 833 1716 224 283
1997 978 1854 239 333
All Years 867 1854 213 295
such as wheat or olives. Aggregate variations over the years are primarily a reﬂection of
ﬂuctuations in annual precipitation.
4.2 Water consumption
The average cooperative in the sample cultivates 960 acres of land, of which 600 acres are
allotted to ﬁeld crops, 200 acres to orchards, and the rest is used for intensive farming of
vegetables and ﬂowers, mainly in greenhouses. To cultivate these crops, the average farm
utilizes 650,000 m3 (approximately 488 acre-feet) of water, an average of 677 m3 of water per
acre. However, this average consumption is misleading, since a signiﬁcant share of the land
is allocated to dry agriculture and consumes no water. It is interesting to note that the value
of the crops per cubic meter have increased ﬁvefold since 1950 (Kislev 2001). This reﬂects
considerable technological improvement, in particular in the 1990s, during which our data
was generated. Water productivity is estimated to have increased by 25%. Our empirical
formulation of the demand function in the next section takes those changes into account by
adding a productivity trend variable.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of agricultural water consumption. It shows
considerable variations in water application across farmers, while changes in aggregate con-
sumption over the years are moderate. The explanations for the diﬀerences across coopera-
tives are similar to those provided for the dissimilarities in quotas. However, it is interesting
to note that changes in consumption over the years are much smaller than the ﬂuctuations in
the quotas. This strengthens our contention that the consumed quantities reﬂect economic
demand, rather than administrative decisions.
10Table 2: Agricultural Water Consumption (thousands of cubic meters)
Year Mean Max Min Std. Dev.
1992 609 1600 83 281
1993 647 1346 83 296
1994 626 1500 83 298
1995 654 1600 100 315
1996 637 1600 38 338
1997 649 1441 38 349
All Years 637 1441 38 313
4.3 Prices
By the early 1990s Israel was going through a rapid process of depleting its water reser-
voirs. The 1959 Water Law, which had been enacted under entirely diﬀerent circumstances,
authorized the agricultural minister to levy charges to recover the cost of supplying the wa-
ter. Furthermore, every price change had to be approved by the ﬁnancial committee of the
parliament, where the government encountered a powerful agricultural lobby. In its quest
to rationalize water consumption, while adhering to the spirit of the law of preventing the
crowding out of small, ﬁnancially fragile farmers, the government of Israel established, in
1991, the increasing block-rate tariﬀ.
According to the ordinances there are three tiers, which are determined by historical
quotas. The lowest price block is applied for consumption of up to 50% of the (historically
ﬁxed) quota. The medium tariﬀ is levied on consumption between 50% and 80% of the quota
and consumption above 80% is charged the highest price block. Using historical quotas as
benchmarks for price blocks creates exogenous variation across farmers regarding the price
schedules they face, thus facilitating our estimation.
Figure 3 presents the three block-rates (deﬂated by the CPI) from 1992 to 1997. It
can be seen that initially, real prices declined, but since 1994, all three block rates have
been rising. Note, however, that the relative prices of the various tiers have changes over
the period, reﬂecting a dynamic political compromise between the farmers’ lobby and the
government on the one hand, and varying amounts of precipitation on the other. Table 3
presents the distribution of irrigated water over the three tiers in the years 1992-1997. The
ﬁrst column in Table 3 presents the yearly proportion of water used by farmers who pay the
lowest price at the margin, columns 2 and 3 the proportions used by farmers who pay at


















Figure 3: The block rates
Table 3: Distribution of Water (Farmers) over Tiers (percentage)
Year 1st Tier 2nd Tier 3rd Tier Total (1000 m3)
1992 12 (23) 58 (55) 30 (22) 112704
1993 11 (21) 44 (46) 45 (33) 119743
1994 14 (24) 44 (46) 42 (30) 115660
1995 13 (24) 39 (42) 48 (34) 120917
1996 16 (31) 41 (40) 43 (29) 117800
1997 15 (31) 40 (39) 45 (30) 120091
Average 14 (26) 44 (44) 42 (30) 117853
use in our panel. In parentheses we report the proportion of farmers paying each price at the
margin.
On average, 26% of the farmers, using 14% of the water, paid only the lowest price block
while 44% of the farmers who utilized 44% of the aggregate water did not reach the highest
price block. Only 30% of the farmers reached the highest price tier, with a consumption share
of 42%. The ﬁrst column reveals that the share of farmers in the ﬁrst block is nearly twice
their consumption share, indicating preservation of small farms. As was mentioned earlier,
under the assumption that the highest price block represents the social marginal value of
water, the actual allocation is not optimal. The data also shows some dynamics over the
years, but not a
monotonic trend. Our econometric ﬁndings are reported in the following sections.
125 Results and Simulations
The parameter estimates of our model are reported in the following subsection, where we
discuss the eﬀects of the various explanatory variables on irrigation, their signiﬁcance and
goodness of ﬁt. In the second subsection we use our estimates to compute the elasticities
under the various speciﬁcations and compare them with the aggregate elasticities obtained
via simulation.
5.1 Estimation
The ﬁrst column in Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of our model. We
ﬁnd that the maximum likelihood estimate of λ is 0.653, an intermediate case between the
linear and logarithmic models. We tested both hypotheses, that λ = 0 and that λ = 1,
and rejected them at a 1% signiﬁcance level. Thus, the Box-Cox speciﬁcation is signiﬁcantly
better than both restricted forms – the logarithmic and the linear. Nevertheless, we also
report the estimates for the logarithmic and linear models in order to assess the sensitivity
of our results to the functional form.
In all three speciﬁcations, water prices have a signiﬁcant, negative eﬀect on water
use. In contrast, the price of other inputs has a small insigniﬁcant eﬀect, implying small
substitutability between water and other inputs. As expected, ‘Rain’ has a signiﬁcant (with
the exception of the linear speciﬁcation) negative eﬀect on water demand. This variable
indicates the amount of rainfall during the months of April and October. In Israel, there is
virtually no rain between May and September, which is when crops are irrigated extensively
and there is abundant precipitation between November and February, during which time
there is no irrigation at all. During the months of April and October rainfall is spurious
with high variability. Therefore, relatively high precipitation levels during April and October
reduce irrigation during those months and thereby annual irrigation. As expected, more rain
during those months signiﬁcantly reduces farmers’ annual irrigation levels.
Lagged water use turns out to be highly signiﬁcant in our data, suggesting that the
eﬀect of price changes extends beyond its ﬁrst-year eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, the long-term eﬀect,
P∞
j=0 γj = 1/(1−γ), varies between 1.62 in the linear to 1.81 in the logarithmic speciﬁcations.
That is, over-time, water use changes by an additional 62 to 81% of its ﬁrst-year eﬀect.
Water quota is also highly signiﬁcant, increasing irrigation between 0.21 m3 for each
additional cubic meter of quota in the Box-Cox, to 0.31 in the logarithmic speciﬁcation. That
is the case although the quotas were not binding for almost 90% of the farmers and penalties
13Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Speciﬁcation Box-Cox Logarithmic Linear

































Log Likelihood −6638 −6744 −6678
Number of Obs. 1110 1110 1110





























Figure 4: Predicted versus Actual Water Distributions
were never imposed when they were surpassed. The explanation for this correlation is that
quotas serve as a proxy for the farmers’ amount and type of land, which are known to the
water commissioner and to the farmer, but are unobservable for the researcher. For example,
it may be known to the commissioner that some farmers’ lots are sandy and therefore require
more irrigation than the region’s average. In this example, farmers with higher quotas irrigate
more than the average farmer, generating a positive correlation.
The total ‘Year’ eﬀect is positive indicating, ceteris paribus, augmentation of water
use over-time. The ‘Year’ eﬀect is twofold. On the one hand, it captures productivity im-
provements in agriculture, increasing the VMP and therefore raising water use. On the other
hand, over-time improvements in water saving technology may under certain circumstances
reduce water use. Our ﬁndings indicate that the productivity eﬀect dominates the water
saving eﬀect.
It is conventional to assess the estimation’s goodness of ﬁt by comparing the predicted
to the actual properties of the water use distributions.3 Figure 4 draws those two distributions
and reveals that the two are quite similar. Table 5 lists the moments of the two distributions.
In particular, note that the predicted average use in our sample is 654 (1000 m3) compared
with the actual average use of 649.
Finally, we tested the lag structure by estimating the model twice; once under the
constraint that the coeﬃcient of
Zλ
it−1−1
λ in equation (8) equals γδ and once without that
constraint. Comparing the maximum likelihood of the two models, we could not reject, at
3The predicted values were obtained by simulating our sample at the actual prices, as outlined in the
Appendix.
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Std. Dev. 348 322
Skewness 0.228 0.261
Kurtosis 2.007 2.178
a 5% signiﬁcance level, the restricted model in favor of the unrestricted one, supporting the
validity of the lag structure.
5.2 Elasticities
To make the results reported in Table 4 comparable across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, we
compute the demand elasticities with respect to the variables and report them in Table 6.
With respect to water prices we report in the ﬁrst row the estimated elasticities for the
short-run, computed as β1(p/w)λ. These elasticities reﬂect the slope of the VMP curve
and would have been the actual elasticities under a single-price regime. However, as we
argued earlier, under block-rate pricing, the estimated elasticity overestimates the aggregate
elasticity because some farmers are located at the horizontal section of the price schedule.
To evaluate the aggregate elasticity we simulated the irrigated agricultural sector to predict
water use under the actual price schedule and under the actual price schedule increased by
1%. It is evident that the greatest gap between the aggregate and estimated elasticities is
with the logarithmic speciﬁcation and the smallest is with the linear. The reason for this is
that the steeper the demand curve, the less farmers will optimally choose to use the threshold
water levels between blocks. We estimate the proportion of farmers that would optimally
choose thresholds w1 or w2 to be 35% under the logarithmic, 25% under the Box-Cox and
10% under the linear speciﬁcation.
Rain in April and October turns out to have a smaller than expected eﬀect, although
recall from Table 4 that it has the expected sign and is signiﬁcant under the Box-Cox and
logarithmic speciﬁcations. As the precipitation variability during these months is large, it
is not uncommon to have years with either half or twice the long-term average. Comparing
such two years, the irrigation levels between them will diﬀer by 6 to 7 percents, according to
the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations. Finally, it is interesting to note that the eﬀects of water quotas
16Table 6: Demand Elasticities
Box-Cox Logarithmic Linear
Estimated price elasticity
Short-Run −0.358 −1.323 −0.146
Long-Run −0.594 −2.401 −0.237
Aggregate price elasticity
Short-Run −0.299 −0.812 −0.133
Long-Run −0.496 −1.474 −0.216
Other-input price elasticity
Short-Run 0.033 0.303 0.041
Long-Run 0.055 0.550 0.067
Rain elasticity −0.047 −0.043 −0.029
Water Quota elasticity 0.347 0.348 0.333
and past use are quite similar in all three speciﬁcations.
To summarize the main ﬁnding of this section, although there are considerable dif-
ferences across model speciﬁcations farmers’ demand appears to be sensitive to water price
changes and almost half of the eﬀect occurs after the ﬁrst year of the price change. In the
following section we study the eﬀects of switching from a single-price regime to a block-rate
one on water demand and social welfare.
6 Comparing Increasing Block-Rate Tariﬀ and the Single-
Price Regimes
Block-rate pricing advocates argue that facing a marginal price that reﬂects the marginal
social cost of water, farmers will use the socially optimal quantity while paying less, on
average, than the marginal social cost. This way, they argue, society can reach the optimal
water allocation without burdening farmers with the costs associated with marginal pricing.
A necessary condition to achieving the optimal allocation is that every farmer’s demand
function intersect the price schedule at the highest tier. Unfortunately, that is practically
impossible due to farmers’ heterogeneity. In practice, the more productive farmers, who, on
average, use larger quantities of water, reach the highest price block, while less productive
farmers, who irrigate less, pay a lower marginal price. Figure 5 demonstrates the diﬀerential
eﬀect of switching from a single-price p0 to the block prices p1,p2 on farmers with diﬀerent
demand functions. Following the switch, lower-productivity farmers enjoy a marginal price
reduction from p0 to p1 and consequently increase their water use from w1 to w2, while high-
productivity farmers experience a marginal price increase from p0 to p2 and reduce their use
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Figure 5: Welfare eﬀect of block-rate pricing
farmers reduce it, what is the net eﬀect of a change in price regime on aggregate water use?
Analytically, if the average water price remains the same under the two regimes, the answer
is equivocal. Empirically, we can answer this question by simulating a price-regime switch.
We ﬁrst simulate the agricultural sector to ﬁnd the predicted water demand under a
single-price that equals the 1997 weighted average price. That is, we examine a hypothetical
switch from the actual block-price regime that existed in 1997 to a single-price regime that
would have maintained the same average price. It turns out that the aggregate demand
under the single-price regime is 7% higher than under block pricing. This outcome conﬁrms
the basic intuition that block prices can substantially reduce the level of irrigation without
raising the cost to farmers. Thus, in Israel, where the switch from a single-price regime to
block prices was designed speciﬁcally for that purpose, it achieved its purpose.
Alternatively, suppose that the policy-maker chooses a single-price that would maintain
the same actual aggregate irrigation level. It turns out that such a single-price would be 20%
higher than the average price under block prices. Again, this outcome conﬁrms our prior
belief that overall, farmers pay less under block prices. However, as we saw in Figure 5 a
switch to block prices has diﬀerent eﬀects on farmers with diﬀerent productivity levels and
therefore has potentially important welfare consequences, an issue that we explore next.
By welfare, we mean the sum of all farmers’ proﬁts, plus the total amount they pay for


























Figure 6: Inter farm ineﬃciency
regimes with the same aggregate water use, C is the same in both cases and can be ignored.
In practice, we calculate for each farmer the area under the estimated demand function
(8) in 1997 and sum it over all farmers. We ﬁnd that, empirically, switching to a block-price
regime in a way that would maintain the same aggregate use raises all farmers’ proﬁts and
reduces the revenues to water suppliers.4 Since the loss to the water suppliers was larger than
the farmers’ aggregate gain, the switch to block prices lowered social welfare. This does not
mean that all farmers always gain from block prices; rather it is the outcome of the speciﬁc
price schedule that was enacted in Israel at the time of our study. What is inevitable is the
aggregate welfare loss that follows a switch to block-rate pricing and the reason for this is
quite simple. Let ˜ p denote the single-price that maintains the same aggregate use. It must be
that the lowest price tier, p1, is lower than ˜ p and the highest price p3 is higher than ˜ p; that is,
p1 < ˜ p < p3. Therefore, the smaller the quantity a farmer uses, the closer the average price
he pays to p1 and the greater his gain from switching to block prices. In contrast, the greater
the quantity he uses, the closer the average price he pays to p3 and the less he gains from the
switch. As we saw in Figure 5, less productive farmers have lower demand curves than the
more productive ones. Hence, the former increase their water use at the expense of the latter
which is socially ineﬃcient. This inter-farm ineﬃciency, is demonstrated in Figure 6, where
for each farmer we chart the change in predicted water use when switching from a single-price
4Actually, since in 1997 there was a block-rate regime, we estimated the eﬀect of switching from it to the
single price that would have maintained the same aggregate use.
19to block pricing, against his productivity level.5 Overall, farmers with higher productivity
irrigate more under a single-price regime, while less productive farmers irrigate more under
block prices. This outcome should not come as a surprise as one of the manifested goals of
block pricing is to encourage small and medium farming.
In the above simulation, we compared price regimes that yield the same aggregate
irrigation level. We also examined a switch from a single-price regime to block pricing
that would maintain the same average cost (rather than maintaining the same aggregate
use in the previous exercise). In that case, we ﬁnd that aggregate demand declines by
approximately 14%. Since under this alternative the average cost of water is the same in
the two regimes, some farmers lose from the switch. Again, since block pricing favors small
farmers, less productive farmers beneﬁt while the more productive farmers lose from the
switch. The diﬀerence between this and the previous scenario is that the cost of switching
to block pricing shifts from the water suppliers to the more productive farmers, who are
inadvertently subsidizing their less productive colleagues.
7 Conclusions
We found that farmers’ water demand is responsive to prices. We estimate that within
the ﬁrst year after a price increase water demand responds with an elasticity of 0.3 and
that demand continues declining thereafter, reaching a long-term elasticity of 0.46. Our
ﬁndings corroborate the common belief that using block pricing enables policy-makers to
lower aggregate demand without raising the average cost of water to farmers. Comparing the
actual block prices that existed in 1997 to the theoretical single-price that would maintain
the same average cost, we estimated that under block prices, the aggregate water use would
be 7% lower, that small farmers would pay a lower average price and use more, and that large
farmers would pay a higher average price and use less than under the single-price regime.
Hence, switching to block pricing achieves the dual goal of reducing aggregate water use
without increasing the water cost for small family farms.
And yet, these achievements should be balanced against the inter-farm ineﬃciencies
that are typically the outcome of block pricing. These ineﬃciencies stem from the fact that
in reality there is large heterogeneity among farmers and therefore it is practically impossible
to design a block-pricing schedule in which all farmers will pay the same marginal price.
In reality, small farmers will pay the lowest price tier whereas large farmers will pay the
5As proxy to farmers’ productivity we use their estimated dummy’s parameter value.
20highest (socially optimal) price tier at the margin. Hence, in switching from a single-price
regime to a block price regime that results in the same average cost, small farmers would
increase irrigation while large farmers will reduce it. If smaller farms are typically less
productive (if they were more productive they would have earned more and would have
expanded production), then block pricing beneﬁts the less productive at the expanse of the
more productive. The alternative of course is to beneﬁt all farmers at the expense of the
water suppliers.
While potential inter-farm ineﬃciencies are a serious concern, our estimates indicate
that with our dataset, the switch to block pricing creates an eﬃciency loss of less than 1%
of total agricultural output. Given the alternative of switching to block pricing at the same
average water cost and bearing an eﬃciency loss of 0.4% or raising water prices by 20%
(in both cases the aggregate water use declines by 7%), most policy-makers would ﬁnd the
block-pricing option more appealing.
218 Appendix
Once the normality assumption is imposed on the errors, we can formulate the observation
likelihood in terms of the standard normal distribution. We then outline the simulation
procedure. To this end, let v = α + ε and let gvα(v,α) denote the joint density of v and




α and ρ = σα/σv.
Likewise, gεα denotes the density of the variable(s) in the subscript. We will also use f and F
to denote the density and the cumulative distribution functions of a standard normal random
variable, respectively.
The probability of observing a certain irrigation level w (given in equation (5)) is


















gvα(w − D(p3,q,z),α)dα (9)
where α1 ≡ w1 − D(p1,q,z), α2 ≡ w1 − D(p2,q,z), α3 ≡ w2 − D(p2,q,z), and α4 ≡ w2 −
D(p3,q,z).
The deﬁnition of conditional distribution implies that gv,α(v,α) = gα|v(α | v)gv(v), and
the independence of ε and α implies that gεα = gεgα. Hence, equation (9) becomes
L(w,θ) = gv(w − D(p1,q,z))
Z α1
−∞




+ gv(w − D(p2,q,z))
Z α3
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Since gv,α is bivariate normal it follows that gα|v(α | v) is N(ρ2v,σ2
α(1 − ρ2)). We are
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22where
hj = [w − D(pj,q,z)]/σv j = 1,2,3

























8.1 The simulation procedure
The simulation procedure is aimed at assessing the industry response to a price change under
block-prices and the eﬀect of a price regime change on welfare. To evaluate the eﬀect of a
change in the price schedule on aggregate water demand one cannot trust the estimates of 4,
as we already saw that the latter is only an upper bound on the aggregate eﬀect. In principle,
the aggregate eﬀect has to be calculated as follows: evaluate the expected water use of each
farmer twice – before and after the change in the price schedule, where the expectation is
with respect to the density of individual water use. The aggregate eﬀect is the sum of the
individual eﬀects.
The key element in our simulation is the density of individual water use which is given
in equation (11). Note that this density depends on the variables in z as well as the individual
farm thresholds w1 and w2 and consequently depends on their observed values. We calculate
the expected individual water use, conditional on the price schedule and the other farm
characteristics, as follows Z ∞
0
wL(w,ˆ θ|zi,w1i,w2i) (12)
23where i is a farm index and ˆ θ is the vector of maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters
in θ. The integral in (12) is calculated numerically over the domain of observed individual
water use where the integral increments were chosen so that the estimated densities of all
observation sum to one (up to 10−5). The welfare level can be expressed as a function of
water use and thus, evaluations of welfare level and welfare changes are not conceptually
diﬀerent. The calculation will be based on the expected individual welfare, as a function of
individual water use, with respect to the same density as in (12).
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